This paper analyses the effect of voters' information on politicians' incentive to tax and transfer resources. In particular we investigate why fiscal churning arises. We provide a multiperiod model of political competition in which voters imperfectly observe the electoral promises made to other voters. Voters are homogeneous and taxation is distortionary, but candidates have an incentive to offer inefficient levels of transfers and in equilibrium fiscal churning arises. Voters whose transfers are more visible receive lower transfers. Increasing the transparency of the electoral campaign does not unambigously raise voters' welfare: transparency on transfers is good but transparency on taxes is bad.
Introduction
Most voters have imperfect information about government policy. Even avid viewers of C-SPAN have no way to fully compute the real resource costs of the thousands of government programs. In a recent article in the New York Times 1 we read: "Mr. Hollings [U.S. Senator], who contends that the government hides its debt no less egregiously than Enron did, asked Mitchell E. Daniels Jr., the White House budget director, to swear personally to the accuracy of the government's financial reports....By any standard, Washington does not do a good job of keeping its own books. Mr. Daniels issued a report card this year on government performance that gave poor grades for financial management to every major cabinet department, and his own agency to boot. 'This is a serious subject,' Mr. Daniels said. 'No one could attest to the accuracy of the government's books." ' The idea that voters' imperfect information may have an effect on policy goes back at least to Downs (1957) , and has received a lot of recent attention. 2 This paper focuses on a basic form of imperfect information that has been largely ignored. In the model, the lack of information is about what other voters are offered. Why should a voter care about this? Because the amounts offered to other voters determine the size of the government debt, and hence future taxes and policies. It turns out that this simple channel potentially generates a rich set of implications about government policy. These predictions about government policy emerge despite the absence of any of the more standard channels that have been explored in the literature. We assume no direct conflict between voters and politicians: we assume that politicians are only interested in getting elected, they do not extract rents from voters as in much of the prior literature. The model also does not require any asymmetry of information between the voters and the politician with respect to the 'type' of the politician: we assume that all politicians are identical.
To see how imperfect information of this type may have an impact, suppose that all voters are identical, that taxation creates distortions, and that there are two identical periods. In such a world, there is no scope for government and, if voters are perfectly informed, candidates would promise to do nothing. Suppose now that voters cannot see what others are being offered. It is easy to see that promising nothing is no longer an equilibrium. Suppose it were. Then candidates have an incentive to privately promise some voters that, if elected, they will give them some transfers. Several recent papers are concerned with the effects of inferior information on the ability of politician to shirk or to extract rents (e.g., Besley and Burgess (2002) ). Other papers consider models with an agent of uncertain ability and discuss the effect of imperfect information on the incentives of the agents, and on screening (e.g. Prat, 2002) . Stromberg (2002) discusses the role of mass media in informing voters, and shows that more informed voters obtain higher transfers. Particularly related is Alt and Lassen (2002) . See below.
Country/Year
Churning GDP Since other voters cannot observe such promises, they keep voting as in the purported equilibrium. However, the groups that are being offered transfers are now more likely to vote for the candidate who is offering them. In equilibrium voters are all offered transfers and they understand that these will result in deficits.
The goal of this paper is to fully explore the scope of this type of phenomenon. It seems that this simple idea can have far reaching implications.
The model can address the following puzzle. A large fraction of individuals are at the same time taxpayers and recipients of government transfers (in various forms). These two way transactions between individuals and the public sector are very inefficient since both taxes and transfers generate distortions: everybody would be better off if all these taxes and transfers were netted-out so that those who are net recipients of resources would pay no taxes, and those who are net payers of resources would receive no transfers. In other words, a puzzling feature of modern public finances is that a large fraction of what citizens pay to the government through taxes is returned to them through transfers. As Peggy and Richard A. Musgrave (1988) note, "fiscal systems have been criticized for generating an excessive amount of "churning" or "cross-hauling", that is, useless tax and expenditure flows which increase the size of the budget but which are mutually offsetting and thus impose an unnecessary burden." Table 1 documents the importance of this phenomenon for selected OECD countries. Fiscal churning varies from 6.5% of GDP in Australia to 34.2% for Sweden. On average, one third of all Government expenditure is returned back to the same citizens who pay for it. These numbers suggest that there would be a simple way to obtain a major improvement in the efficiency of fiscal systems that would have no redistributive impact: simply net-out everyone's fiscal obligations.
The argument does not apply with full force to spending programs such as education that can in part be justified on the grounds of the externalities provided by such spending. Other, programs, such as welfare programs, can be justified on the basis of social altruism. But a large part of transfers in western democracies seem to be conflicting with any public or social criterion and to be inspired by horizontal redistribution among different socioeconomic groups. It is somewhat surprising that the electorate tolerates such inefficient redistribution of resources towards special interest groups. A growing literature has addressed the question of how such inefficient transfers can be part of a political equilibrium. 3 However, it is probably more surprising that many groups are at the same time taxpayers and recipients of transfers, since taxes and transfers generate distortions. It seems that electoral competition should guarantee that such blatant inefficiencies ought to disappear. Any candidate could increase his electoral prospects by reducing taxes and transfers simultaneously for any voter who is suffering 'churning' so as to make each voter a net payer or a net receiver. This paper analyses the forces behind fiscal churning. These issues are not typically studied in standard political economy models of redistribution that rely on median voter tools (Roberts 1977, Meltzer and Richard 1981) because such netting-out is not feasible by construction: most models allow very limited tax instruments for the government. The standard framework in those models involves a proportional tax on income and a general transfer which is independent of income. In such a model, anyone with an income is a tax payer and everyone is a recipient of transfers. However, these assumptions are made for reasons of tractability, and it is not clear that the fiscal tools available to governments are so highly constrained to generate the very high levels of churning that we observe in table 1. It seems that some partial netting-out should be possible. In any event, it is useful to understand whether churning could emerge in a model that does not impose it via constraints on the feasible set of policies available to the government. Furthermore, it seems implausible to argue that the large degree of variation in churning across countries that we see in table 1 could be explained exclusively by different constraints on the fiscal instruments. By investigating whether churning can emerge absent such constraints, we can begin to understand the role of the political process in generating such different outcomes.
We show how fiscal churning emerges as an equilibrium outcome when voters are imperfectly informed of the transfers that are received by other groups. Thus, the model can explain why netting-out does not take place. The basic idea behind this phenomenon is the following. Given that information about transfers is imperfect, as discussed above, candidates will have an incentive to offer transfers to voters that will result in deficits. If in addition to signals about transfers, voters have a separate signal about revenues, then, for any positive deficit, smoothing the burden of the taxes across periods is desirable and therefore in equilibrium all voters receive transfers and pay taxes. Thus, politicians are led to simultaneously request a tax and offer a transfer to each group. Roughly, this arises because churning reduces suspicions among other voters that any group is being offered excessively high net transfers. Note that this outcome would not arise if the political system were perfectly transparent.
A surprising feature of our analysis is that voters can be worse off when they have perfect information about others groups' taxes. When taxes are perfectly observed, candidates have the incentive to simultaneously offer high transfer and high taxes and this results in more inefficient outcomes. Thus, our model calls for enhancing transparency on the expenditure side more than on the taxation side.
A second set of results in our model concerns politicians incentives to choose from several alternative means of offering transfers. Different means may come with varying degrees of transparency, as well as varying degrees of inefficiency. Direct lump sum transfers are probably most efficient, but it is relatively easy for voters to understand the aggregate value of such transfers and their consequences for deficits and future distortions. In contrast, distorting the construction of public projects in a way that leads to rents for some groups is a less efficient way to transfer resources to such groups but it is probably harder for voters to figure out the true cost of these transfers. In some cases politicians will favor transfers that are less transparent even if they are more inefficient. Analogously, taxes that are less easily observable are probably going to be lower in equilibrium. Thus, transparency introduces an additional dimension to optimal taxation in the eyes of the politician. This extension of the model is related to Coate and Morris (1995) who focus on the form of transfers to special interests. They consider the important question of why such transfers are often implemented through inefficient means. They show that inefficient transfers can be chosen if voters have imperfect information on the value of such transfers (they might be efficient) and on the type of politician (they might be corrupt), but the choice of inefficient means of redistribution happens through a different channel. Interestingly, in our model, the incentives of politicians go in opposite directions regarding the transparency of taxation and transfers. Politicians favor the most transparent means of raising revenues and the least transparent means of offering transfers. The reason is that both are ways to try to convince other voters that the deficit -and hence future taxes -is going to be small. Finally, it is also possible to study the consequences of differential transparency across groups. If transfers to some groups are more easily detectable, such groups will, in equilibrium, receive lower transfers. An interesting feature of this analysis should be that political systems with the same average transparency may have markedly different outcomes.
This paper contributes to a growing literature that identifies the inefficiencies in the dynamics of electoral competition. A large part of this literature has focused on the incentives to run budget deficits. Persson and Tabellini (1997) Lindbeck (1985) and Musgrave and Musgrave (1988) noted that a characteristic of modern fiscal systems is that gross transfers are much larger than net transfers, while Palda (1997) provides estimates of churning for Canada. However, we are aware of no model that attempts to explain this phenomenon.
Model
We build on the model of redistributive politics provided by Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) and Dixit and Londregan (1996) . We depart from these authors in three ways: we introduce endogenous labor supply, we look at a dynamic environment with an intertemporal linkage provided by debt, and we allow for imperfect voter information.
We first describe the structure of the model in a static environment, and then we describe the intertemporal links between periods.
Economy
There is a unit measure of voters living in an economy where there is a single consumption good. Each voter has the same utility function u (c − γ (l)) over consumption c and labor l, where u is, strictly increasing and concave, γ is strictly increasing and convex. Both u and γ are assumed to be differentiable three times. This specific form of separability between consumption and labor is assumed mainly because it simplifies the derivation of some properties of the equilibrium. A more general utility function would complicate the analysis but should not change the substance of the results.
Initially we assume that all workers receive the same wage which is normalized to 1. Extending the model to heterogenous wages is straightforward. Voters are divided into groups indexed by i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}. We assume for simplicity that each group has the same mass of individuals 1/N .
A voter in group i receives a lump-sum transfer y i and pays taxes on labor income according to a proportional rate t i . Note that taxes are distortionary, as they are levied on the labor income. 4 The budget constraint of the individual is then
So each individual chooses c i and l i to maximize u (c i − γ (l i )) to (1) . Denote by l (t i ) voter i's optimal labor supply given tax rate t i . Thus, labor supply l (t i ) in period i is given by
) voter i's indirect utility function over taxes and transfers.
Politics
There are two candidates, R and L. We assume that candidate are office motivated, so they have no interest in policy per se. Candidates compete to maximize their vote share 5 by making binding promises of taxes t i and transfers y i to each group of voters i, subject to an aggregate balanced budget constraint. In addition to those 'material' preferences, voters also have ideological preferences. Each voter in group i is endowed with a personal ideological parameter x, which captures the additional utility that the citizen enjoys if party R is elected. For each individual, x is the realization of an independent draw of a random variable X i . This ideological parameter is meant to capture additional elements of the political platforms of the two parties which is not related to economic policy. An example would be the parties' attitudes towards issues such as foreign policy or religious values. Candidates do not observe the ideological parameter of voters, they only know the distribution 4 Assuming that taxes are proportional to income simplifies the analysis. We could write down a model where voters privately observe their abilities and politicians are allowed to choose taxes optimally from any nonlinear, group specific, tax schedule.
All that is needed for the substance of our results is that distortions from taxation are convex in the amount that is raised from a group. 5 For the purpose of the analysis, it does not matter whether candidates only care about winning or they care about the share of the vote. 
Thus, the probability that voter i votes for candidate L given the candidates promise
Given that there are infinitely many voters in each group,
s also the fraction of group i voters who vote for candidate L. Adding up across groups, we obtain candidate L's total vote share
that maximizes S L subject to the non-negativity constraints
As in Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) , in order to guarantee existence of a pure strategy equilibrium we assume that the objective function of both candidates is strictly concave. A sufficient condition is that, for all i,
, and convex in y R i , t R i . We refer the reader to Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) to details.
Equilibrium
We will first consider the special case in which all groups are identical, namely, f i = f for all i. This is a useful benchmark. When we look at the dynamic model, we will make this assumption because it clarifies the effects of imperfect information: as will become clear, this is a model where, in the absence of imperfect information, candidates are completely inactive. Thus, all of the action will come from informational considerations.
In the static setting, when there is no heterogeneity between groups, equilibrium takes a very simple form: taxes and transfers are zero. Given that groups are identical, candidates offer the same transfers to all groups. Because taxation is distortionary it is better for a candidate to set this common level of transfers to zero, i.e. to promise to do nothing. Furthermore, this outcome does not depend on the information available to each group of voters because the voting decision is not affected by the offers made to other voters. Each voter only cares about the offer he has received. The following result formalizes this discussion.
Proposition 1
In a one period model, regardless of voters' information, (i) Any equilibrium is symmetric-symmetric
= (y, t): both candidates make the same offers to all groups;
(ii) each candidate offers (y, t) = (0, 0)
Proof. See Appendix. This result says that, when groups are homogeneous and there is a single period, this model generates no government activity. The intuition is that, because voters are identical, and because candidates objective functions are concave in transfers, there is no gain to offering different transfers to different voters. Because taxation distorts labor supply decisions, candidates will choose zero taxes and hence zero transfers.
When groups have different characteristics, namely, they have different F i 's, the equilibrium platforms are more interesting. Let us order the indeces i = 1, ..., N so that f i (0) > f j (0) if and only if i < j, i.e., lower indexed groups are more responsive.
Proposition 2
There exists an H > 1 such that, all groups with i < H receive positive transfers and pay no taxes, while all groups with i ≥ H receive no transfers and pay positive taxes.
Proof. See Appendix. The intuition for this result is the following. As in Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) , candidates have the incentive to appeal to voters who are more responsive (as measured by f i (0)). Given the balanced budget constraint, the only way to offer something to these voters is to tax other voters, and candidate will tax voters who are less responsive. Note however that for any given group, in this single period model, candidates either offer a transfer to a group of voters, or they tax this group; candidates never engage in fiscal churning. The reason is that if a group pays positive taxes and receives positive transfers, it is possible to increase this groups's welfare and therefore the vote share gained by the candidate from this group without affecting any other group. This can be done by reducing transfers and tax revenue from this group by the same amount, i.e., by netting-out the fiscal position of the group. Because taxes are distortionary, the group benefits by this netting out.
Two periods
We now move to a two period environment. Intertemporal considerations, in particular the possibility of deficit financing are essential for a discussion of the role of transparency.
In a static setting, Proposition 1 showed that the equilibrium was invariant to the information available to voters regarding the offers made to other groups of voters. This was because each voter cared only about his own offer. However, in a dynamic setting, information becomes relevant, since aggregate promises have implications for the size of government debt, and debt has to be repaid out of future taxes. Thus, the voter prefers small promises to other groups as these imply lower debt.
There are two periods, each period is the same as the one described in Section 2: preferences are the same in both periods, the set of voters and the set of candidates are the same at both dates and elections are held in both periods. We assume that the government finances the debt by borrowing from abroad and we rule out the possibility of default on the debt. We assume that the interest rate is zero and there is no discounting in order to save on notation.
We now assume that all groups are identical. The second period game is like the game described in Section 2, except that budget balance requires that the debt D accumulated in the first period is repaid
In the second period the extent of information available to voters has no effect, since they will simply vote for the party that promise them the higher utility. A simple modification of the argument in Proposition 1 implies that candidates will not promise any positive transfers in the second period (y j i2 = 0) and the burden of the debt will be divided equally among the N homogenous groups:
In the first period, voters take into account the equilibrium that will arise in the second period subgame. In particular, the voting decision will be based not only on the first period offer, but also on the total debt resulting from all offers. For any first period offer ³ y j i1 , t j i1´h e receives, the voter forms a conjecture about period 2 taxes t j i2 , where, as will become clearer in the next section, this conjecture is based on the amount of information he receives. Of course, this conjecture is consistent with candidates' equilibrium offers.
Moreover, for any
, each voter chooses savings to smooth consumption across periods. In our framework, this implies that a voter equalizes utility perfectly across periods. Hence, for any
, he chooses labor supply in the two periods to maximize
The value to a voter over two periods can be written as
Then, the intertemporal budget constraint is given by:
or, using the fact that, in equilibrium, second period taxes are the same for all groups,
Thus, given promises
is the tax rate that will ensue at time 2 if candidate j wins the elections at time 1. So it may be the case that a voter chooses a candidate that does not offer him the highest period 1 utility. For example, a voter with ideology x = 0 might prefer candidate L even though candidate R offers him a higher transfer y L i1 < y R i1 and a lower tax rate t L i1 > t R i1 . This would be the case because the voter anticipates that if candidate R is elected, the period 2 taxes will be so high that on aggregate he will be better off under candidate L's policy.
Thus, the vote share maximized by candidate L is
where t L i2 , t R i2 are the tax rates that voters expect are necessary given the promises made by the two candidates in the first period.
Benchmark: Perfect Information
When voters perfectly observe all promises made by the two candidates, the best thing that a candidate can promise is again nothing. Voters will detect for sure any transfer offered to some groups and therefore candidates do not offer any transfer.
Proof. See Appendix Notice the contrast between this result and the previous literature on government deficits. Again, this is a useful benchmark because it will show that all the action in our model is coming from information imperfections.
Imperfect information
We assume now that each group of voters perfectly observe the taxes and transfers that each candidate promise to them. However they only see a signal of the promises to other groups. More formally, with probability p they observe perfectly taxes and transfers to other groups, 6 and with the complementary probability 1 − p they receive no information whatsoever.
In the event that voters do not observe all the offers, their voting decision in this game depends on their beliefs about offers that the two candidates made to other voters. Arbitrary beliefs can be assigned following out-of-equilibrium offers. We follow the Vertical Contracting literature by assuming individual holds "passive beliefs" (McAfee and Schwartz, 1996; Segal, 1999): even after observing an out-of-equilibium promise from a candidate, the voter believes that the other voters face their equilibrium promise. We have investigated the robustness of our results to this assumption. In particular, we have considered a model where candidates control promises only with noise and have obtained very similar results. See below, and Appendix B.
Consider candidate's L incentive to deviate from an equilibrium outcome
offering an arbitrary profile of promises,
while candidate R is promising the equilibrium profile
. When taxes and transfers are not observed, a voter in Group 1 will vote for candidate
6 the only thing that matters for a voter is the aggregate debt resulting form offers to other groups and not the precise composition of those offers. So for voters in group i it doesn't matter if group j has been offered y is the tax rate that will ensue in the period two subgame
s the equilibrium budget deficit for candidate j. Note that when the voter is calculating next period level of taxes, she is only considering the deviation she has observed, while other voters offers are held at their equilibrium level.
When all promises are observed, this voter in Group 1 will vote for candidate L iff
where now
Potentially, candidate's L deviation can take very different forms. Candidate's L can consider a change in the transfer to one group only, two groups or changing taxes and transfers simultaneously. The following lemma helps us in narrowing down the kind of deviations that the equilibrium must be immune to.
Lemma 4 Consider a putative equilibrium
profile of promises by candidate j. Suppose there exists a profitable deviation by candidate k that involves changing the transfer or the taxes to two or more groups. Then there exists a profitable deviation by candidate k that involves changing the transfer to one group only.
Proof. See Appendix The power of the lemma is that without loss of generality we can restrict our attention to deviations to one group only. Note that in this case for the group that receives an out-of-equilibrium offer, the events of observing the offers made to other groups or not observing them yield the same indirect utility
Groups receiving the equilibrium offer ³ŷ i1 ,t i1´w ith probability 1−p will not observe the deviation and therefore their indirect utility is
With probability p they will observe the deviation and in which case, their expected time 2 utility is
The vote share of the candidate following the deviation is
The first term is the vote share obtained from the group that receives the deviation. The second term is the vote share from the remaining N − 1 groups in the event they observe the deviation (probability p) and the last term is the vote share when they instead do not observe the deviation (probability 1 − p).
must solves the above maximization. As in the static model, an equilibrium can only be symmetric-symmetric, so that both candidates make the same offers to all groups of the population. This is intuitive, since voters are homogeneous and have no a priori preference for one candidate.
The following Lemma shows that in the first information scenario, first period taxes must be zero. Hence, there is no churning.
Lemma 5
If the only aggregate measure voters observe is government debt, then first period taxes will be set at zero.
Proof. To prove this, note first that the statement is obviously true if transfers are zero (it is clear that there is no gain from budget surpluses). Assume now transfers and first period taxes are strictly positive. But then a candidate can obtain more votes by reducing transfers and taxes to keep debt unchanged. Contradiction From the expression 10, it seems intuitive that, when p < 1,ŷ 1 = 0 cannot be part of an equilibrium. Ifŷ i1 = 0 for all i, each candidate would have the incentive to give a small positive transfer to one group, gaining an increase in vote share of ∆ 1 from this group. This deviation is only detected with probability p < 1 by the other groups, with a decrease in vote share of ∆ 2 . Note that ∆ 1 and ∆ 2 are of the same order of magnitude for a small deviation ifŷ 1 = 0. However the vote loss ∆ 2 ensues with a probability p < 1 while the vote gain ∆ 1 happens with certainty, which destroys the purported equilibrium. This corroborates our intuition thatŷ 1 = 0 cannot be part of any equilibrium:
Proposition 6 When p < 1, equilibrium debt is positive: D (p) > 0. All voters are treated identically. In the first period, transfers are positive and taxes are zero y 1 > 0 and t 1 = 0. In the second period, transfers are zero and taxes are positive y 2 = 0 and t 2 > 0. Furthermore, if γ 000 ≥ 0 and p < 1, then debt is positive and decreasing in p.
Proof. See Appendix. The construction of the equilibrium heavily relies on the assumption of passive beliefs. However, the assumption is not essential for the main effects highlighted in this paper. What is important is that when voters receive an out-of-equilibrium offer, they do not believe that other groups have received an even better offer. In Appendix B we modify the model by allowing for the possibility that offers are observed with noise and we show that in such a model the unique equilibrium has features that are essentially identical to those of the model described above.
The result that debt is higher in less transparent political systems has recently emerged in the literature. Milesi-Ferretti (2003) 
Fiscal Churning
We now enrich the previous information structure. We still assume that voters have imperfect information regarding the electoral promises of the candidates. However they see separate signals about aggregate transfers and aggregate taxes. Specifically, voters in each group observe two signals. The first signal reveals aggregate transfers perfectly with probability p and reveals nothing with probability 1 − p. The second signal reveals aggregate tax revenues with probability q and nothing with probability 1 − q.
This richer, more disaggregated information structure can give candidates an incentive to smooth taxes across periods. This then implies fiscal churning.
Proposition 7
If γ 000 ≥ 0, and 1 > q > p, then t 2 > t 1 > 0. Debt (and t 2 ) are independent of q but t 1 is increasing in q. Thus, transfers increase with q and welfare decreases with q. If q < p,
Proof. See Appendix Note that we now have fiscal churning. In the first period, voters receive transfers and pay taxes at the same time, while they would clearly be better off if the taxes would be reduced to zero and the transfer reduced accordingly. However, this cannot happen in equilibrium. Transfers will be positive in this environment for the same reason as they were before. What is more, if a candidate promises zero taxes and positive transfers in the first period to all voters, he will lose for sure, as the other candidate can win just by promising the same transfer, but smoothing taxes perfectly across periods. In the previous environment, this wasn't profitable because with probability 1 − p voters would have no information on aggregate debt, while now they observe tax revenues. So an out-of-equilibrium offer of increasing taxes and transfers at the same times becomes very attractive, as with probability 1 − p voters believe that their taxes tomorrow will be lower.
This opportunity for candidates has very unfavorable consequences for voters. The transfer they receive is higher now, but this comes at the price of higher taxes and hence higher distortions. As a result, the welfare of the voters is now lower. Higher transparency on taxes may be harmful.
Heterogenous Information
Assume now that groups are heterogenous in the information they have. Some offers are observed with a higher probability than others. More specifically, transfers to N 1 groups are observed with probability p 1 , while transfers to the remaining N 2 groups are observed with probability p 2 > p 1 . Taxes are observed perfectly, i.e. q = 1. The incentive is now to offer higher transfers to groups that are observed with a lower probability p i .
Proposition 8
In equilibrium voters are not treated identically. For N 1 large enough, in the first period y i1 (p 1 ) > y i1 (p 2 ) . In the second period t i2 = t 2 and y 2 = 0 for all groups.
Proof. See Appendix The Appendix also shows that a similar result holds when groups are heterogeneous with respect to the probability of observing taxes q i . Candidates tax more heavily groups that are observed with a higher probability q i .
This result provides an interesting interpretation of a puzzling phenomenon discussed in Palda (1997). Palda finds that in Canada fiscal churning rises with income deciles: higher income individuals face more churning. Palda argues that this phenomenon is puzzling because it is reasonable to expect that higher income individuals are more informed about fiscal policy and the political process, and that therefore they should be faced with less distortionary policies. A consequence of Proposition 8 is that there is more churning for groups whose transfers are observed with lower probability. Assume then that higher income individuals indeed possess better information. This can be interpreted as lower income individuals having worse information about transfers offered to high income people. Therefore, Proposition 1 suggests that an explanation of higher churning for higher income individuals is that, precisely because these individuals have better information, transfers offered to them are relatively hard to observe by the rest of the population, leading candidates to favor offering higher transfers to these voters.
Another interesting implication of Proposition 8 involves a comparison of two societies with the same level of average aggregate transparency that differ in the extent of heterogeneity of transparency across groups. For instance, assume that one society has the same level of transparency p for all groups, whereas in the second society transfers to N 1 groups are observed with probability p 1 , and transfers to N 2 groups are observed with probability p 2 , with
= p. a corollary of Proposition 8 is that the size of government, taxes, transfers, and deficits are larger in the second, more heterogeneous society. The intuition is that what determines the size of government is the marginal incentive to offer transfers to a group. In the heterogenous society this incentive is determined by the least transparent group. Thus total future distortions have to be sufficiently high to deter sneaky transfers to such a group. This emerges very starkly if u is linear: in this case, all that matters for determining the size of the deficit is the transparency of the least trasparent group: all other groups receive nothing.
Public Goods
To be added
The first order condtions are
and similarly for candidate R. Taking ratios
or both for all i. The "both" case is impossible because it implies that one candidate doesn't satisfy the budget constraint with equality. If y (11) and (12), we have
Substituting into (13) and using
which can hold iff t ∂l(t) ∂t = 0, i.e. if t = 0. From the budget balance condition (4) we then have y = 0
Proof of Proposition 2. The equilibrium conditions are:
and similarly for candidate R. Combining
which by the same argument of the Proof of Proposition 1 can hold only if
Proof of Lemma 4. Consider candidate R offering an equilibrium profile of promises
. A deviation involving a change of z to the transfer to 1 < M < N groups by candidates L yields
¢¢¤ where the two terms represent the gain in vote share from the M groups that receive an additional transfer and the last two terms represent the loss in vote share from the remaining N − M groups. The second and third terms represent the change in vote share when taxes and transfers are observed perfectly, which happen with probability p.
In particular, all groups realize that tomorrow's tax rate will be such that a per capita revenue of y has to be raised (first term), while those that don't receive a different transfer from the putative equilibrium still think that the tax rate will not change from the equilibrium tax rate.
Maximizing (14) with respect to z we obtain
Consider now a deviation z to a single group. (14) reads as
Comparing (16) and (18) we see that they can both hold only if z = 0 Note that z = 0 is what is required for
to be an equilibrium profile. If z > 0
cannot be an equilibrium profile. Furthermore, both equations cannot hold since the last term in (16) is negative and smaller than the last term in (18) , while the first two terms are the same. This means that for z > 0, the y 
which implies that for any deviation that involves Mz resources distributed to M groups, there exists a (more) profitable deviation that involves z resources only distributed to a single group.
Proof of Proposition 6. In order to characterize the equilibrium, we need to understand government incentives to distribute taxes across periods. Recall that the value to the voter over two periods can be written is
When only the aggregate debt is observable, we know that t 1 = T 1 = 0. When debt is D, voters' value function over the two periods is defined by U (y, 0, t2 (y)) = 2u
where y = t2l2 (t2 (y)) .
Consider a debt D = N y and a deviation of additional transfer z to group 1. The vote share gain for a deviating candidate is proportional to
Differentiating with respect to z, we obtain
which must be zero at z = 0.
rearranging we obtain the equilibrium condition:
For p = 1 equation 20 becomes
which can only hold for y = 0. Note that, as N → ∞ equation 20 becomes
At equilibrium, candidates should not have incentive to offer "sneaky" transfers. Distortions must be sufficiently high that, when deviation is observed, voters are sufficiently badly-off that vote share loss deters candidate from offering increased transfers. Now observe that from equation (19) ,
where the second equality holds because of optimality of labor supply. In addition, we have that
Thus, ∂U (y, 0, t2 (y)) ∂t2
Substituting into equation (??) and simplifying we obtain
where we have substituted
which can be verified by differentiating implicitly in equation (6) .
To obtain the relation between debt and transparency, differentiate equation (??) implicitly with respect to p to obtain:
≥ 0 (in equilibrium we must be on the increasing portion of the Laffer curve), debt is decreasing in p if and only if the term in parenthesis in the denominator of the right hand side is negative, i.e.,
Since γ 00 > 0, inequality (22) holds if γ 000 ≥ 0.
Proof of Proposition 7. Fix first period tax revenues at T1, consider a debt D (implying second period revenues of D), and a deviation of an additional transfer z to group 1. The vote share gain for a deviating candidate is proportional to
ifferentiating with respect to z, we obtain
rearranging we obtain the equilibrium condition
we can rewrite the equilibrium condition as
which is the same as equation (??) . Thus, t2 is independent of q. Let us now obtain the optimal relation between t 1 and t 2 . Consider a candidate equilibrium y * , t * 1 , t * 2 in which debt is D * = y * − t * 1 l1 (t * 1 ) and suppose a candidate deviates and increases t1 on group 1 to t1 + z. Then, incremental revenue in period 1 (reduction in debt) following the deviation is
implying that needed (and equilibrium) revenue in period 2 falls by ∆D, leading to a new tax rate for everybody in period 2 of
Thus, the change in vote share for the candidate is:
differentiate this expression with respect to z to obtain:
which, in equilibrium, should be zero at z = 0. Thus, the expression simplifies to
Since U (y, t1, t2) = 2u
Substituting in equation (23) we obtain
The result that t 1 < t 2 for q < 1 follows if we show that
is decreasing in t.
by substitute into this equation the following expressions
and
The right-hand side of this expression is positive if and only if tγ 00 + l (γ 00 ) 2 + lγ 000 t > 0 which holds because γ 000 ≥ 0.
We now show that t1 (q) is increasing in q1. Differentiate equation (24) with respect to q to obtain
Thus,
which holds because γ 000 ≥ 0.
Proof of Proposition 8.
1. Assume q = 1 and assume without loss of generality that p1 < p2 and define D = D1 + D2. Assume y1 and y2
are the equilibrium transfers and T are the equilibrium tax revenues, equal for all groups. Since q = 1 we know y = 2T in equilibrium. The deviation is financed with higher taxes in period 2 only. Hence, any candidate offering an extra transfer of x to one of the groups in N1 would gain
while offering the same extra transfer to one of the groups in N2 would give him
he first order conditions for an interior solution are
In equilibrium x = 0. Hence this system of equations can be rewritten as
Note that p2N1 > p1 (N1 − 1) + 1 for N1 large enough. Hence
2. Assume that q 1 < q 2 and that for each p i = p. Let us now obtain the optimal relation between t 1 and t 2 .
Consider a candidate equilibrium y * , t * 1 , t * 2 in which debt is D * and suppose a candidate deviates and increases t1 to a group to t1 + z. Then, incremental revenue in period 1 (reduction in debt) following the deviation is
Thus, when deviation is offered to one of the Ni groups, the change in vote share for the candidate is
differentiate this expression with respect to z and imposing the equilibrium condition z = 0 we obtain: 
We know (l11 + t11l 
Appendix B
In this appendix we provide an example of a simple modification of the model in which it is not necessary to assume passive beliefs: in this version of the model there is a unique equilibrium with properties that are very similar to those of the model described in the text. In order to save on notation and space, we assume that u is linear and that the disutility of labor is quadratic: γ (l) = γ 2 l 2 .
We assume that there is a noise e L 1 on transfers offered by L and e R 1 for transfers offered by R. There is no noise on individual level taxes but there is no signal of aggregate revenues. Just as in the previous analysis, this implies that in equilibrium first period taxes are zero.
Given a choice of y L , y R i of transfers by L and R, the probability that a voter votes for R is:
Pr[yL + e which is also R's expected vote share. This can then be rewritten as:
Pr[e 
